Abstract We consider a two-sided matching market in which the traders are partitioned into two sets; the set of sellers and the set of buyers. Each seller owns at most one indivisible good and each buyer owns a certain amount of money. Money is assumed to be an integer variable. Each trader can trade with at most one trader of the opposite side. The marriage model of Gale and Shapley is a special case of our model. We give a constructive proof to show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome.
Introduction
Theoretical studies of two-sided matching markets started after the pioneering paper by Gale and Shapley [6] . In two-sided matching markets the set of participants-called playersis partitioned into two sets. The main purpose in such markets is to match the players of one side to the players of the opposite side. A matching consists of pairs such that both players of a pair belong to the opposite sides and each player appears at most once. A player is matched if he belongs to the matching, otherwise he is unmatched. A matching is called stable if each player is acceptable to his/her partner and there is no pair of players from opposite sides which are not matched to one another but prefer each other to their current partners.
1
In the study of two-sided matching markets there are two standard models, the marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [6] and the assignment game by Shapley and Shubik [15] . In the marriage model a player of one side is matched with at most one player of the opposite side. Monetary transfer is not permitted in their model. Associated with each player is a strictly ordered finite list containing each player of the opposite side. Gale and Shapley described an algorithm which produces a stable matching in this model. In the one-to-one buyer-seller model by Shapley and Shubik [15] , known as an assignment game, money plays an explicit role. In this model side payments are permitted. Shapley and Shubik showed that the core of the assignment game is a non-empty complete lattice. Gale and Shapley's marriage model and Shapley and Shubik's assignment game have been widely studied and several variations and extensions of these can be found in the literature.
Eriksson and Karlander [1] gave a model which is a common generalization of the marriage model and the assignment game. The existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes is shown in their paper. Sotomayor [16] further investigated the model of Eriksson and Karlander [1] and gave a non-constructive proof of the existence of pairwise stable outcome. The existence proof of Eriksson and Karlander holds players are buyers each of whom has a certain amount of money. We also assume that each player can trade with at most one player of the opposite side. It is also assumed that the transfer of money from buyer to seller has an upper bound and a lower bound and the money is given in integers.
Mathematically, we describe our model as follows. Denote the finite sets of the sellers and buyers by P and Q, respectively, and the set of all possible seller-buyer pairs by E = P × Q. We express lower and upper bounds of prices by two vectors π, π ∈ Z E where
It is natural to think that each player has preferences over the players of opposite side. We give the preferences of the players by utility functions defined below. For each (i, j) ∈ E, ν ij (x) denotes the utility 3 to the seller i if he/she trades with the buyer j (that is, matched with j) and receives an amount x of money. Similarly, ν ji (−x) denotes the utility to the buyer j if he/she trades with the seller i and pays an amount x of money.
4 Furthermore, for each (i, j) ∈ E, we suppose that ν ij and ν ji are increasing and defined by
where α ij and α ji are given positive real numbers, β ij and β ji are any given real numbers and x ∈ Z. If ν ij (x) ≥ 0 we shall say that the buyer j is acceptable to the seller i at x. This means that i is willing to trade with j at the amount x. Similarly, ν ji (−x) ≥ 0 means that the seller i is acceptable to the buyer j at x. We remark that even if i and j are mutually acceptable they may not be matched with each other since both i and j have preference lists and a stable matching depends upon the preferences. We say that i prefers j to j at x and x if ν ij (x) > ν ij (x ). Similarly, j prefers i to i at x and x if ν ji (−x) > ν ji (−x ). A seller i is indifferent between j and j at x and x if ν ij (x) = ν ij (x ). Moreover, a buyer j is said to be indifferent between i and i at x and x if ν ji (−x) = ν ji (−x ). If ν ij (x) ≥ 0 for some x ∈ Z, then the buyer j is acceptable to the seller i at x by definition. However, if ν ij (x) = 0 then we say that the seller i is indifferent between the buyer j and himself at x. 5 Similarly, if ν ji (−x) = 0 for some x ∈ Z, then we say that the buyer j is indifferent between the seller i and himself at x. Since the preferences of the players purely based on the monetary transfer, we can assume that preferences of the players are not strict.
A matching, denoted by X, is a subset of E such that each player appears at most once. Given a matching X, k ∈ P ∪ Q is said to be unmatched in X if it does not appear in X; otherwise matched in X. A matching X is individually rational if each player is acceptable to his/her partner in X. Let (i, j) be a seller-buyer pair who are not matched to one another in a matching X but prefer each other to their current partners in X. Then (i, j) will be said to block the matching X. 6 A matching X is said to be pairwise stable if it is individually rational and is not blocked by any seller-buyer pair.
2 Throughout the paper, Z and R stand for the set of integers and the set of real numbers, respectively. The notation Z E stands for the integer lattice whose points are indexed by E. 3 Due to the nature of our model, we depart from our former terminology of saying ν ij and ν ji as valuations. 4 For convenience, we do not write a plus sign with x in ν ij (x). However, it always means that i is a payee. The negative sign in ν ji (−x) means j is a payer. 5 Recall that if a player is unmatched, we say it self-matched. 6 Assume that a seller-buyer pair (i, j) blocks a matching X and let us say that i is unmatched. This means that i prefers to be matched with j rather than staying single.
A 4-tuple (X; p, q, r) is said to be an outcome if X is a matching, p is a price vector and (q, r) ∈ R P × R Q is defined by
Mathematically, we define the pairwise stability as follows. An outcome (X; p, q, r) is pairwise stable if the following two conditions are satisfied:
Condition (ps1) says that the matching X is individually rational. Condition (ps2) means (X; p, q, r) is not blocked by any seller-buyer pair. A matching X is called pairwise stable if (X; p, q, r) is pairwise stable.
Existence Of Pairwise Stable Outcome
The procedure adopted by Farooq [2] to show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome when money is a continuous variable does not work in our case. We will use different mathematical tools and give a constructive proof to show that there always exists a pairwise stable outcome in the model described in Section 2. Initially, we define p ij ∈ Z, for each
for which this inequality holds. Before describing the algorithm mathematically, we first give an outline of the algorithm. Initially we will exclude all those seller-buyer pairs such that at least one of them is not acceptable to the other. Then, from the set of mutually acceptable seller-buyer pairs, we will find a matching X of all those seller-buyer pairs such that buyer is the most preferred for the seller and the sum of the utilities to the matched buyers is maximum. We define q and r by (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Then the 4-tuple (X; p, q, r) obviously satisfies (ps1). However, if there exists a mutually acceptable seller-buyer pair such that the seller is unmatched then it may form a blocking pair, that is, (ps2) may not hold. To eliminate all such pairs, we will modify the corresponding components of the price vector. It is worthwhile to note that the price vector will be non-increasing and the size of matching will be non-decreasing throughout the algorithm. If the price vector is decreased then the preference lists of the players may change. Therefore a matched player may change his partner according to the new preference list. We will make it certain that a matched buyer will remain matched. However, it is not required that a matched seller will remain matched. Throughout our procedure, we will exclude two kinds of unmatched pairs, if they appear; (i) those sellerbuyer pairs such that the buyer is not acceptable to the seller and (ii) those seller-buyer pairs such that the corresponding component of the price vector is the lower bound and 7 The notation R P (resp. R Q ) stands for real vector space with coordinates indexed by P (resp. Q). 8 For any x, y ∈ Z, we define [
the payoff of the buyer is not greater than his/her utility to the seller. If the price vector remains unchanged in some iteration, then at least one kind of a seller-buyer pair mentioned above will be eliminated. Since the price vector is discrete and bounded and the number of players is finite, the algorithm will be terminated after a finite number of iterations. Now we present our algorithm mathematically. First, we define some subsets of E which will help us to find a matching satisfying (ps1). Define two subsets L 0 and E 0 of E as follows:
2)
Then L 0 is the set of those seller-buyer pairs where the seller is not acceptable to the buyer, whereas, E 0 is the set of those seller-buyer pairs where buyer is not acceptable to the seller. The set of mutually acceptable seller-buyer pairs is defined by
We also defineq i , for each i ∈ P , bỹ
and
The maximum over an empty set is taken to be zero by definition. The set E P contains those seller-buyer pairs which are mutually acceptable and the buyer is most preferred for seller out of all acceptable buyers. Initially we put r = 0 and define a subset E P of E P by
At this stage, obviously E P = E P . However, in the subsequent iterations of the algorithm, E P may be a proper subset of E P . Also, define Q = ∅. Let X be a matching in the bipartite graph (P, Q; E P ) that satisfies the following conditions:
(a1) X matches all members of Q, (a2) X maximizes (i,j)∈X ν ji (−p ij ) among the matchings satisfying (a1).
Define the vectors q and r by (2.2) and (2.3), respectively. Then from (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain
Let Q denote the set of matched buyers in X, that is,
The main purpose of defining E P and putting condition (a1) on the matching is to keep the vector r non-decreasing throughout the algorithm. The condition (a2) will help us to prove (ps2) at termination of the algorithm. Next, define a set U by
Then U is the set of all those seller-buyer pairs that are mutually acceptable and the buyer is most preferred for the seller but the seller is unmatched in X.
In each iteration of the algorithm, we will modify p in such a way that (ps1) and the feasibility of p (that is, π ij ≤ p ij ≤ π ij for each (i, j) ∈ E) are preserved. To modify p, we find an integer n ij , for each (i, j) ∈ U , by
Now we modify the price vector p. The modified price vector is denoted byp and is defined byp
Then obviously π ij ≤p ij ≤ π ij for each (i, j) ∈ E. Define a subset E 0 of U as follows:
We finally propose our algorithm.
Algorithm:
Step 0: Put r = 0 and Q = ∅. Initially define p, L 0 , E 0 , E,q, E P and E P by (3.1)−(3.7), respectively. Find a matching X in the bipartite graph (P, Q; E P ) satisfying (a1) and (a2). Define r, Q and U by (2.3), (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. Step 1: If U = ∅ then define q by (2.2) and stop.
Step 2: For each pair (i, j) ∈ U , calculate n ij by (3.11) and findp by (3.13). Define L and E 0 by (3.12) and (3.14), respectively. Update E 0 by E 0 :
Step 3: Put p :=p and modify E by
Defineq by (3.5). Modify E P and E P by (3.6) and (3.7), respectively, for the updated E and p. Find a matching X in the bipartite graph (P, Q; E P ) satisfying (a1) and (a2). Define r, Q and U by (2.3), (3.9) and (3.10), respectively. Go to Step 1. In the rest of the work, we will show that our algorithm works correctly and terminates after a finite number of iterations. We will add prefixes (old) * and (new) * to sets/vectors/integers before and after update, respectively, in any iteration of the algorithm. When the context is clear we will not add these prefixes. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3, there exists a matching in the bipartite graph (P, Q; E P ) satisfying (a1) and (a2).
Proof. It is enough to prove that (old)X ⊆ (new) E P in each iteration at Step 3. Initially the set E 0 is defined by (3.3) at Step 0 before finding the matching. Then in each iteration at
Step 2, E 0 is augmented if E 0 is nonempty, otherwise, it remains the same. Also L, E 0 ⊆ U and U ∩ (old)X = ∅ at Step 2. Therefore, (3.13) and (3.15) imply that (old)X ⊆ (new) E P at Step 3. By (3.7), (old)r j is the lower bound of ν ji (−(new)p ij ) for each (i, j) ∈ (new) E P . Therefore, (old)X ⊆ (new) E P .
The next lemma describes the important features of the algorithm. This lemma will be used to prove the subsequent lemmas. Specifically, the first two parts are crucial in proving the termination of the algorithm in a finite number of iterations. Proof. (i) Initially the price vector p is defined by (3.1) and in each iteration it is modified by (3.13). From (3.13), one can easily see that p decreases or remains the same at Step 3. If U = ∅ then we findp by (3.13) at Step 2. For each (i, j) ∈ U , n ij is a positive integer. Now, if U \ {L ∪ E 0 } = ∅ then one can easily see from (3.13) thatp ij = p ij − n ij for all (i, j) ∈ U \ {L ∪ E 0 } at Step 2. This proves the assertion.
(ii) Initially E is defined by (3.4) at Step 0 and it is modified by (3.15) at Step 3 in each iteration. If L = E 0 = ∅ at Step 2 then E remains the same at Step 3. If L = ∅ at Step 2 then E reduces at Step 3. If E 0 = ∅ at Step 2 then E 0 enlarges at Step 2 and consequently, E reduces at Step 3.
(iii) By the proof of Lemma 3.1, we have (old)X ⊆ (new) E P at Step 3. Hence, for The next two lemmas do hold in each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3.
Lemma 3.3. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3, we have
ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) ≥ (old)r j for each (i, j) ∈ (old)U , where n ij is calculated at Step 2. Furthermore, if ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) > (old)r j for some (i, j) ∈ (old)U then (old)p ij − n ij is
the maximum integer for which this inequality holds.
Proof. Let (i, j) ∈ (old)U at Step 3. Then
Next we prove that if ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) > (old)r j then (old)p ij − n ij is the maximum integer for which this holds. Assume that ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) > (old)r j . Since n ij ≥ 1 by definition (3.11), we first consider the case when old)p ij − 1) ). This proves the assertion when
Next we consider the case when
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This means that ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) > (old)r j > ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij + 1)) which implies that (old)p ij − n ij is the maximum integer for which ν ji (−((old)p ij − n ij )) > (old)r j .
Lemma 3.4. In each iteration of the algorithm at
Step 3, we have
which this inequality holds.
Proof. We prove the second part of the assertion. Assume that
where n ij is calculated at Step 2. The second part of the assertion follows from the second part of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.5. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3, we have (new)p ij = π ij and
Proof.
Step 3. Then the first part of the assertion is true by (3.12) and (3.13). We prove the second part. 
The next lemma, in some sense, is more general than Lemma 3.4 and will play a critical role in proving (ps2). Lemma 3.6. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 3, if 
Proof. Assume that ν ji (−(new)p ij ) > (new)r j for some (i, j) ∈ E in the first iteration of the algorithm at Step 3. Then
Step 3 is the initial value defined by (3.1). The definition (3.1) yields that (new)p ij is the maximum integer in [π ij , π ij ] Z for which ν ji (−(new)p ij ) > 0 at
Step 3. Thus, the result holds in this case. Now, let (i, j) ∈ (old)U at Step 3. Lemma 3.2 (iii) yields that (new)r j ≥ (old)r j . Therefore, ν ji (−(new)p ij ) > (old)r j . Hence, Lemma 3.5 implies that (i, j) ∈ (old)U \ L, where L is defined at Step 2. Thus, by Lemma 3.4, we conclude that (new)p ij is the maximum integer in [π ij , π ij ] Z for which this inequality holds. This proves the result in the first iteration.
We suppose that the assertion holds in all iterations fewer than t, t ≥ 2. We shall show that the assertion holds in t-th iteration. Assume that ν ji (−(new)p ij ) > (new)r j for some (i, j) ∈ E at Step 3 in t-th iteration of the algorithm. Firstly, consider the case when
Step 3 in t-th iteration. Then (old)p ij = (new)p ij by (3.13) . Therefore, by assumption we get Proof. Suppose that the algorithm terminates at Step 1. Then U = ∅ and let (X; p, q, r) be the 4-tuple obtained at termination. Initially we set r = 0 and find a matching in the bipartite graph (P, Q; E P ) satisfying (a1) and (a2). Then we define the vector r by (2.3) at
Step 0. Also, initially we define E by (3.4). Therefore
Step 0. Since in each iteration we modify E by (3.15) at Step 3, therefore (3.17) holds in each iteration at Step 3. Also E P ⊆ E in each iteration, the definitions (2.2) and (2.3) imply q ≥ 0 and r ≥ 0 at termination. Thus, (ps1) holds true. Next we show that (X; p, q, r) satisfies (ps2). We claim that for any (i, j) ∈ E, if there exists a c ∈ [π ij , π ij ] Z with c > p ij then the following inequality holds:
If the algorithm terminates in the first iteration then by (3.1) the inequality (3.18) obviously holds. Otherwise, we divide our argument in two cases:
If ν ji (−p ji ) ≤ r j then the monotonicity of ν ji implies (3.18). If ν ji (−p ji ) > r j then by Lemma 3.6, we obtain (3.18). Further, since X ⊆ E P , the definition (3.6) of E P implies that for any matched seller i in X, the following inequality is satisfied:
Note that U = ∅. Also, L 0 ∪ E 0 and E are disjoint and cover all of E. Therefore, if there exists some seller i unmatched in X then (i, j) ∈ L 0 ∪ E 0 for each j ∈ Q. If (i, j) ∈ E 0 for some j ∈ Q then ν ij (p ij ) ≤ 0 = q i (3.20) by definition. From (3.19) and (3.20), we obtain Proof. In each iteration of the algorithm at Step 2, either L and E 0 are empty or at least one of them is non-empty. We first consider the case when L = E 0 = ∅. Then by Lemma 3.2 (i), p ij decreases for each (i, j) ∈ U . Note that p is discrete and bounded, and by Lemma 3.2 (i), it decreases or remains the same. Therefore, the vector p can be decreased a finite number of times. Next we consider the case when L = ∅ or E 0 = ∅. In either case, E reduces at Step 3 by Lemma 3.2 (ii). Furthermore, E reduces or remains the same in each iteration of the algorithm by Lemma 3.2 (ii). Therefore, this case is possible at most |E| times.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a two-sided matching model where money is a discrete variable. More specifically, the money is given in integers. The preferences of the players are represented by increasing utility functions. The existence of a pairwise stable outcome is guaranteed in our model. It is not certain that one can get a pairwise stable outcome in a many-to-many version of our model by using the same mathematical apparatus. Further, one can observe from Theorem 3.2 that the complexity of our algorithm may depend on the size of those intervals where prices fall. It would be worthwhile for someone to devise an algorithm whose complexity is polynomial in the number of players.
